In many service industries, companies compete with each other on the basis of the waiting time their customers' experience, along with other strategic instruments such as the price they charge for their service. The objective of this paper is to conduct an empirical study of an important industry to measure to what extent waiting time performance measures impact different firms' market shares and price decisions. We report on a large scale empirical industrial organization study in which the demand equations for fast-food drive-thru restaurants in Cook County are estimated based on so-called structural estimation methods. Our results confirm the belief expressed by industry experts, that in the fast-food drive-thru industry customers trade off price and waiting time. More interestingly, our estimates indicate that consumers attribute a very high cost to the time they spend waiting.
Introduction
This paper reports on an empirical study of an important industry, the drive-thru fast-food industry. We estimate a competition model, derived from an underlying consumer choice model, using detailed empirical data. The main goal is to measure to what extent waiting time performance measures, along with price levels, brand attributes, geographical and demographic factors, impact competing firms' market shares. In the literature it is commonly assumed that customers attribute a cost rate to their waiting time that can be proxied by an earnings rate, for example the disposable per capita income in the market (see e.g. Mueller (1985) ). Our results demonstrate that this may result in questionable policy analyses. For the drive-thru fast-food industry, we show that customers attribute an implicit value to their wait time, which is anywhere between $40/hr and $180/hr, much larger than the average wage in the US. We also characterize how the market's price equilibrium responds to changes in the waiting standards. Additionally, we show that the trend in various industries to continuously improve waiting times and service levels can be explained on game-theoretical grounds, creating a valuable framework for future market dynamics studies. While our empirical study is focused on the drive-thru fast food industry, we introduce a methodology which, mutatis mutandis, can be employed to establish the impact service measures have on market shares in other industries.
In many service industries, companies compete with each other on the basis of the waiting time their customers experience, along with other strategic instruments such as the price they charge for their service.
Executives realize that time is money for the consumer but it is unclear how much money, how the exchange rate differs in different industries, and how it varies with other factors such as location, brand etcetera.
In their popular textbook "Competing Against Time", Boston Consulting Group partners Stalk and Hout (1990) documented how time based competition has been reshaping global markets. Often, specific waiting time standards or guarantees are advertised. For example, Ameritrade has increased its market share in the on line discount brokerage market by "guaranteeing" that trades take no more than 10 seconds to be executed; the guarantee is backed up with a commission waiver if the time limit is violated. This has led most major on line brokerage firms (E-trade, Fidelity) to offer and aggressively advertise even more ambitious waiting time standards. Various call centers promise that the customer will be helped within one hour, say, possibly by a callback. See Allon and Federgruen (2007) for a longer list of examples. In other industries, average waiting times are monitored by independent organizations. For example, in the airline industry independent government agencies as well as Internet travel services report, on a flight by flight basis, the average delay and percentage of flights arriving within 15 minutes of schedule 1 .
In the fast food industry, the prime focus of this paper, a common waiting time standard is chosen by each of the chains. The vast majority of fast food outlets are owned by independent franchisees, and while these franchisees select their own prices, chains prescribe a uniform operational process to their franchisees along with specific recipes for their standard menu items. These processes include the order taking process, standard customer greetings, the number and the maximum amount of time burgers can be on the grill, the relationship between lanes and demand volume et cetera, all of which determine the chain's waiting time standard; see Garber (2005) and Jargon (2006) . As a consequence, chains achieve remarkably uniform average waiting times at their franchises 2 . Industry trade organizations such as Quick Service Restaurants, publicize yearly surveys of the average waiting time experienced at the various fast-food chains. Moreover, chains invest heavily to shave seconds off the average waiting times, clearly believing that their market shares are very sensitive to the relative waiting times experienced. An estimate of the expected consumer reponse to reductions in waiting time standards, such as that generated by our study, would be of high value to the industry when evaluating the profitability of potential investments of this type.
To date, almost all contributions to the literature on service competition have been theoretical, with numerical investigations confined to small hypothetical examples. Indeed, we believe ours to be one of the first empirical studies to complement this theoretical literature 3 . There are several reasons for the paucity of empirical studies. It is very difficult to access data regarding customer waiting times, in particular when seeking to quantify the waiting time experience at all competing service providers. While absolute waiting times at a given firm might explain the firm's demand volume in a monopoly setting, it is the relative waiting times at various competing providers which, along with the firms' other strategic choices, explain ultimate consumer choices and hence, realized market shares. Similarly, it is typically very hard, if not impossible, to collect data on sales volumes or market shares of the competing outlets. Although such data are sometimes accessible for consumer products, in the service industry it is rare that sales volumes can be gathered by outsiders. Firms are reluctant to provide the information, considering it of the highest strategic 2 As an example in Jargon (2006) , Jim Hyatt, Burger King's vice president and chief global operations officer, states that the average waiting time at its 6,900 domestic franchises cover a very narrow range from 165 to 170 seconds, in 2006, while this average waiting time was reduced by 22 seconds, compared to the previous year. 3 To our knowledge, the only empirical studies in this area are Deacon and Sonstelie (1985) and Png and Reitman (1994) . The former estimates the joint impact the price differential and difference in average waiting time has on the sales at two neighboring gas stations in Ventura, California. The price differential occurs because of temporary price controls affecting chain owned stations differently from franchised stations. Thus, unlike almost all other industry settings, the price differential is exogenously determined, simplifying the estimation process greatly, as explained below. Png and Reitman (1994) studies what impact average waiting times have on peak hour retail gasoline sales using all 1501 stations in 4 Massachusetts counties. However, that study is not based on direct waiting time observations, but on a proxy for waiting times postulated as a specific function of weakly sales, number of operating hours and number of pumps. Moreover, Png and Reitman (1994) do not estimate how the competing firms' price decisions depend on each other and their waiting times, so that the estimates can not be used to predict the impact changes in waiting time standards would have on the firms' market shares and prices. See Section 2 for a more detailed discussion value 4 . Indeed, sales volumes were unavailable in our context as well. Instead, we infer them by estimating the parameters in the system of equations characterizing the unique equilibrium in a competition model.
In other words, the demand functions are backed out from the equilibrium conditions, with the help of the observed equilibrium. This technique has been applied in a number of economics studies, e.g., Feenstra and Levinsohn(1995) and Thomadsen (2005) but, to our knowledge, not in the operations management literature. Finally, even if and when all of the competing service providers' sales volumes and waiting time standards are available, the endogeneity of various explanatory variables (and the resulting correlation with unobserved attributes of the outlets) neccesitates the collection of additional instrumental variable data in order to accurately estimate waiting time sensitivities.
We report on a large scale empirical study in which the demand equations are inferred from the equations characterizing the unique equilibrium in the competition model which results from a detailed consumer choice model and an outlet cost structure reflecting a broad category of queueing systems. We estimate the model parameters and use the fitted models to conduct counter-factual experiments that demonstrate how changes in waiting time standards impact prices and sales volumes.
More specifically, we accommodate the absence of demand data with three assumptions: (1) The consumers attribute a utility level to each potential outlet, which depends stochastically on price, waiting time, the distance to the outlet and various other outlet specific characteristics. Similarly, consumers assign a utility level to the no-purchase option, which depends stochastically on the consumer's gender, race, age bracket and occupational status. (2) Firms encounter a cost structure which is affine in the sales volume, with random noise terms for the marginal costs; this cost structure applies to many queueing models used to describe the service process such as M/M/1 systems or open Jackson networks. (3) Firms adopt the (unique) Nash equilibrium in the price competition model which results from the above consumer choice model and the outlets' cost structure.
The first assumption is used to derive the relationships between prices, service levels, and sales quantities. Based on the second and third assumptions, these relationships are subsequently used to derive the firms' Nash equilibrium conditions to jointly estimate the parameters of the indirect utility functions of the consumers as well as the parameters of the firms' cost structure. Our estimation method is a Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM), as opposed to more standard maximum likelihood estimators for systems of non-linear equations. This is done for two reasons. First, this method allows for error terms that are correlated with endogeneously chosen explanatory variables (e.g. prices). This endogeneity prohibits the use of standard OLS or maximum likelihood techniques, see Sections 2 and 5. The second reason for using GMM is to avoid making specific distributional assumptions about the error terms. Maximum likelihood estimates, in contrast, require the choice of a specific multivariate distribution of the vector of error terms and, if these error terms are correlated with the explanatory variables, of all conditional error term distributions as well, as explained for example by Hall (2005) . Unless these various distributions are guessed correctly, this author states that "the resulting estimates may lead to biased inferences".
To conduct our empirical tests we have selected the drive-thru fast-food industry. The fast-food industry realized over a hundred billion $ in sales in 2007 with hamburger sales representing 73% of the market.
McDonald's alone reported in excess of $28 billion in revenues, representing 46% of the quick service burger market. The drive-thru sector accounts for about 70% of the industry's sales, a 10% increase from 6 years ago Hughlett (Nov 28, 2008) . QSR (Quick Service Restaurant) Magazine, the industry's trade publication, documents that the various chains offer differentiated waiting time experiences to their customers.
In the 2008 QSR survey of the top 25 chains, the best performing chain in terms of average waiting times (Wendy's) was twice as fast as the least performing chain, 13% better than the second performing chain (Bojangles') and 17% better than McDonald's, the industry leader. Moreover, Wendy's improved their waiting time by over 3% from the QSR survey results 3 years earlier. The chains perceive seconds as having significant impact on consumers' purchasing decisions. QSR reports that chains invest heavily to improve customer waiting and service times and the accuracy with which orders are filled. Recently, in a Chicago Tribune article Hughlett (Nov 28, 2008) , the president of data management at Restaurant Technologies, states that there's an industry maxim that for every seven-second reduction in drive-thru service time, sales will increase 1% over time. Many fast food chains have installed timer systems which allow the management to track how many cars visited the drive-thru at various times of the day and the average time customers spend in the drive-thru. In response, chains may opt to alter their standard preparation and customer interaction processes (??? we have a citation here about greeting wording changes to save 1 sec which we could add).
Chains may also chose to invest in technology to further reduce waiting time.
The data we use consist of the prices, service levels, locations and outlet distributions of the top fastfood hamburger chains in Cook County, Illinois. To accurately represent the impact travel distances and demographic features may have on the consumer choices, we divide the county into more than 1300 socalled tracts, a geographic unit used by the U.S. Census Bureau, with an average area of only 1.2 square miles, and employ the demographic composition of the population in each tract.
In summary, the main contribution of this paper is that, to our knowledge, it is one of the first to estimate, for the benefit of market observers and the chains alike, how sales volumes for a service organization depend on the price and waiting times of all competing providers within a reasonable geographic distance, as well as other attributes (e.g, brand-specific characteristics). In particular, we conclude that consumers attribute a value to their wait time of at least $40/hr for the fast food industry. Moreover, differences in waiting time standards play a more significant role in explaining differences in sales volumes than price differentials. We use conter factual studies to confirm that a 7 second reduction results, on "average", in a 1% market share increase. However, for a large chain like McDonald's, the increase is by more than 3% and sales go up by 15% showing that the industry's "7 second rule" needs to be qualified. Our model explains the continuing trend of all chains investing heavily to reduce their waiting time standards. Finally, we obtain cost estimates indicating significant market power for the chains.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a review of the relevant literature.
Section 3 develops our consumer choice and competition model. Section 4 describes the many data sources employed and the approach we adopted to collect the data. Section 5 is devoted to a description of the Generalized Method of Moments estiamtion technique as applied to our model. Section 6 describes the estimation results and counter-factual studies. Finally, Section 7 completes the paper with a discussion of possible extensions.
Literature Review
The literature on competition in service industries dates back to the late 1970s. As mentioned in the introduction, Luski (1976) and Levhari and Luski (1978) were the first to model competition between service providers. The latter paper addresses a duopoly where each of the firms acts as an M/M/1 system, with exogenous and identical service rates. In this model, customers select their service provider strictly on the basis of the full price, defined as the direct price plus the expected steady state waiting time multiplied with the waiting time cost rate. The question whether a price equilibrium exists in this model remained an open question, until, for the basic model with a uniform cost rate, it was recently resolved in the affirmative by Chen and Wan (2003) . These authors show, however, that the Nash equilibrium may fail to be unique. More recent variants of the Levhari and Luski models include Li and Lee (1994) , Armony and Haviv (2001) and Wang and Olsen (2008) . Cachon and Harker (2002) and So (2000) analyzed the first models in which customers consider criteria beyond the lowest full price when choosing a service provider (e.g., quality). Both confined themselves, again, to M/M/1 service providers. Federgruen (2006,2007) treat the price and waiting time standard as completely independent firm attributes which different customers may trade off in different ways. Nevertheless, Allon and Federgruen (2007) confines itself to systems of demand rates that are linear in the prices and to M/M/1 service providers, while Allon and Federgruen (2006) studies more general demand models, such as attraction models, and allows for more general queueing facilities. We refer to these two papers as well as Hassin and Haviv (2003) for additional references of service competition models.
Another stream of papers, in particular Hall and Porteus (2000) and Gans (2002) , models the competition between services providers selecting a distribution for the (non-congestion related) quality of service, based on specific consumer choice models. Gans et al. (2007) describes an empirical study to test these models with laboratory experiments, as opposed to econometric field studies.
Many service processes are provided via call centers. Here, customers are known to be very sensitive to their waiting times, which is why such centers are designed and staffed to meet specific service level agreements (SLAs) 5 . However, virtually all planning models in the vast literature realted to call centers assume that demand processes are exogenous inputs, or, at best, dependent on service charges. We refer to Gans et al. (2003) for an excellent tutorial on call center management. When describing future challenges in this area, the authors emphasize "a better understanding of customer behavior" ( §7.3) and the need to model and estimate "multiple levels of equilibria". Beyond these levels, we suggest the desirability of models incorporating the competitive effect of service levels provided by the call centers of competing service providers.
The above reviewed literature is based on the observation that firms compete along the service level dimension as well as anecdotal and empirical evidence that customers value waiting time when making decisions regarding their preferred service provider. One example in the fast-food industry is Davis and Vollmann (1990) examining consumer choice criteria with a sample of 723 customers who were asked to rank their satisfaction with various aspects of the delivery process. The authors established that the satisfaction scores were highly correlated with the experienced waiting time, time of day, store location, and whether the customer was at work or school were important factors determining the strength of the waiting time sensitivity. Day of week and participation activities other than work around the meal (e.g., shopping, visiting friends) were not significant. This empirical study complements the earlier quoted plethora of trade literature documenting the centrality of waiting times in this industry. Our study complements the theoretical literature on competition models by estimating the parameters used and assumed by these models.
There have been very few other works which attempt to estimate these parameters. As mentioned in the introduction, the two empirical studies closest to ours are Deacon and Sonstelie (1985) and Png and Reitman (1994) . The former appears to have been the first to estimate the impact price differentials and average waiting times have on sales volumes; however, the setting is one where prices are exogenously determined by government price controls, avoiding the endogeneity challenge inherent in most studies including our own. The selected estimation method is based on a probit model, applicable in the case of two firms only.
The model does not apply to settings with price selecting firms or those where customer choices depend on factors other than the full price. Png and Reitman (1994) describes the peak hour sales in a market of 1501 gas stations in 4 Massachusetts counties via a system of demand equations. These equations are not derived from an underlying consumer choice model as, for example, in Deacon and Sonstelie (1985) or our paper. In the absence of actual observations of the waiting times or the peak hour sales volumes, the authors specify the logarithm of a firm's (peak hour) sales volume as a linear function of the logarithm of the firm's own price, that of the average of the prices of the "nearby" stations, a vector of station attributes, and a proxy for the average waiting time. The latter is postulated as the ratio of the peak hour sales volume and a predetermined power of the number of pumps, while the peak hour sales volume is assumed to be given by the aggregate weekly sales divided by a given power of the number of operating hours. The coefficients in this model are assumed to be homogeneous constants which are estimated via a Least Squares
Regression method. The authors address the problem of the explanatory prices and capacity variables being endogenous to the system, by the use of a two stage least squares method, invoking instrumental variables claimed to be uncorrelated with the error terms. In addition, the transportation research literature has often specified the demand for alternative transportation modes as arising from a Mixed Multi Nomial Logit, model with prices and travel times as explanatory variables, similar to our paper. However, the maximum likelihood estimations typically employed are challenged by the above mentioned endogeneity problems;
see Hess et al. (2005) for a recent example, estimating the implicit cost associated with travel time to be in excess of $100/hr. Finally, an earlier economics paper by De Vany et al. (1983) estimated the effect waiting times have on patient volumes in dentist offices; ignoring the impact of competition and employing OLS, the authors obtain a statistically significant positive value for the waiting time sensitivity, perhaps because in their setting demand is relatively inelastic with respect to waiting times while capacity is inflexible.
In contrast, we estimate the impact of waiting times, prices, geographic dispersion, chain attributes, and demographic factors on demand. Our approach follows the work by Bresnahan (1987) , Berry (1994 ), Berry et al. (1995 . These authors demonstrate how to estimate consumer choice models and cost structures in oligopolistic markets with differentiated goods using aggregate consumer level data and structural models of competition. The general approach posits a distribution of consumer preferences for the competing goods based on their attributes. The preferences are aggregated into a market level demand system that, when combined with assumptions on cost and price-setting behavior, allows one to estimate the parameters.
This estimation method, based on the GMM, allows for prices to be determined endogenously as the equilibrium of an underlying competition model, rather than being selected exogenously. It has the additional advantages, discussed in Section 1, of avoiding distributional assumptions for the error terms and allowing for endogeneity of the explanatory variables. Because of these advantages, GMM estimation methods are used with great frequency in the economics literature ever since their introduction to this field by Hansen (1982) . In the papers mentioned in the previous paragraph, market shares are observed. Feenstra and Levinsohn (1995) were the first to demonstrate how this estimation framework can be used in the absence of quantity data. As mentioned in the introduction, we face the same challenge since in the fast food industry, sales data are not reported and treated as strategic and proprietary information.
More recent work by Davis (2006) and Thomadsen (2005a) incorporated geography in the BLP framework. Thomadsen (2005a) 
The Model
In this section we develop the competition model representing the competitive interdependencies and interactions among the outlets in our geographic region. The model combines two sub-models: (a) a consumer choice model which determines how many of the region's residents and commuters choose, for any given lunch or dinner meal, to go to a fast food establishment and, among those, how many select a specific outlet, and (b) a model to represent the variable cost structure of the different outlets as a function of its sales volume and service level, i.e., its waiting time standard. Combining the two sub-models permits us to derive the outlets' profit functions. As mentioned in the introduction, in the fast food industry, waiting time standards are selected and prescribed by the chains. However, price decisions are relegated to the independent outlets, if for no other reason than to avoid illegal forms of price fixing. As franchising became popular in the sixties, the US courts began to limit the types of pricing restrictions chains can impose on their franchises. Even the specification of maximum retail prices has become illegal, by the Supreme Court ruling in Albrecht vs.
Herald (1968) . (Indeed, we have observed significant price differences among outlets of the same chain, see Table 3 in Section 4.) We can, therefore, assume that the prices observed in the market represent the equilibrium in a price competition model, under given waiting time standards specified by the chains operating in the selected geographical region. We show that this price equilibrium model has a unique equilibrium which is the unique solution of a non-linear system of equations. It is this system of equations which permits us to estimate the parameters that describe the consumer choice model and associated demand functions, as well as the parameters in the cost structure.
In general, one may envision other ways in which the two sets of strategic choices (price and waiting time standard) are selected: for example, settings where all choices are made simultaneously (and by the same players) and those where prices are selected in advance of waiting time standards. See Allon and Federgruen (2007) for a systematic comparison of the three types of competition models.
The Consumer Choice Model
Demand for fast-food meals at each outlet is specified by a discrete choice model. Consumers choose either to purchase a specific lunch or dinner meal from one of the fast-food outlets or to consume an outside good.
Consumers assign a utility value to each outlet as well as to the no-purchase option, specified as a linear function of the price, waiting time, distance, chain identity, observable (to the modeler) attributes of the outlet, and various demographic factors including the consumer's gender, race, age bracket and occupational status. Each of these utility equations contains an additional random noise term. It is natural to assume that customers make their choices in two stages: (i) they first decide whether to dine at a fast food outlet as opposed to alternatives, such as eating at home or a different type of restaurant, and (ii) assuming the first question is answered in the affirmative, which of the various outlets in the region to patronize. We model the two stage choice process by assuming that the (potential) customer attributes a utility value to the nopurchase option which depends on his or her demographic attributes. The customer also assigns a utility value to each of the outlets in the region that depends on the attributes of the outlet and the chain it belongs to. The customer purchases a meal at one of the fast food outlets if and only if the highest of the outlets' utility values is in excess of that of the no-purchase option; in this case the meal is consumed at the outlet with the highest utility value.
Formally, the conditional indirect utility of consumer i from fast food outlet j is specified as follows:
where X j is a vector of dummy variables indicating the chain identity of the outlet (as well as, possibly, other observed properties), D ij is the distance between consumer i and outlet j, P j is the price of a (standard) meal at outlet j, and W j is the waiting time standard (= average waiting time in system), associated with outlet j; β, δ, α and γ are parameters to be estimated, and η ij is the portion of the utility of individual i at outlet j, which is unobserved by the modeler. We assume that for every outlet j, the random components of {η ij } represents non-systemic unobservable variations in the perceived utility of the outlet among potential customers belonging to the same demographic group and residing or working in the same location. We therefore assume that the {η ij } variables are i.i.d. Random utility models of type (1) often contain an additional outlet specific component ξ j , j = 1, ..., N , to address systematic attributes of the firm (outlet), known to the firms and customers but not to the modeler. As argued in Thomadsen (2005a) , in the case of the fast-food drive-thru industry, this term may be omitted because other than through price and location, different outlets belonging to the same chain offer close to identical attributes. At the same time, all chain specific differences in the food, outlet appearance, etcetera are captured by the chain indicator variables in the first term in 1 6 . The indirect utility associated with the no-purchase option is given by
Here, M i is a vector specifying the consumer's age, gender, race, and whether they are at work or at home when making the decision (occupational status). If the age distribution is characterized by A age classes, the M j vector is a binary vector of dimension (A+2): for l = 1, ..., A − 1, M il = 1 if consumer i belongs to the lth age bracket and 0 otherwise, similarly, for l = A, A + 1, andA + 2, M il = 1(0) if the consumer is female (male), African American (white), and a resident (worker) in the relevant tract, respectively. β 0 and π represent another set of parameters to be estimated and η i0 denotes the unknown portion of the utility of individual i for the non-purchase option. Once again, the random components of {η ij } are i.i.d.
We consider a limited number of age brackets. Therefore, there is a finite list of {1, . . . , M } of consumertypes, combining age, gender, race and occupational status. In view of the importance of the distances between the consumer and the various outlets, we partition our geographic region into a grid of very small sub-areas b ∈ {1, . . . , B} = B and assume all consumers residing in a sub-area are located at the sub area's centroid. (In our study, we use tracts, as defined by the U.S. Census, with an average of 1.2 square miles in Cook county.) Thus, all potential consumers residing in a given sub-area b ∈ B and belonging to a given demographic group m ∈ M , share the same mean utility value for all outlets and the no-purchase option.
Assuming the distributions of the random noise terms, {η ij : j = 1, . . . , J}, are Gumbel (or doubly exponential), with common scale parameter µ, this gives rise to the following multinomial logit model in which each outlet's market share for each tract and demographic group is given by the following expression:
Without loss of generality express the utility levels in units such that the scale parameter µ = 1.
Multiplying the market shares with h(b, m), the number of consumers of demographic group m, residing in or commuting to geographic region b allows us to specify expected aggregate sales in an outlet as a function of the various parameters θ ≡ {β, δ, γ, α, π} in the utility equations:
The outlets' cost structure
We assume the outlets' cost structure expressed as a function of its expected sales volume is affine with an intercept that is proportional with the reciprocal of the waiting time standard:
Here, for every outlet j=1,...,J and chain k=1,...,K:
k(j) = the index of the chain to which outlet j belongs, c k = the average variable food, labor and equipment cost rate per customer for an outlet of chain k, d k = the average variable capacity cost rate for an outlet of chain k, j = a noise term, denoting the difference between outlet j s variable cost rate and the norm for his chain, u j = a noise term, denoting the difference between outlet j's variable capacity cost rate and the norm for his chain, Each outlet's marginal cost rate as well as the capacity cost rate are equal to a chain-specific cost plus a zero-mean unobserved component. This specification is supported by the franchisers' effort to create a uniform customer experience across their outlets, by standardizing the equipment, preparation process, and food components used at each of its outlets. The unobserved shock to the cost rate comes from outlet specific conditions, for example, deficiencies in labor productivity, management efficiency, or smaller kitchens creating crowding and reduced efficiency.
The affine cost structure in (5) arises in several queueing models which may describe the service process of an outlet. For example, the structure in (5) arises in an M/M/1 system, where the waiting time standard W denotes the expected total sojourn time in the drive-thru queue and the variable capacity cost is assumed to be proportional with the service rate. More realistically, a fast food service process could be represented as a Jackson (queueing) network. A food order may travel along a path of service stages, from order taking to the cooking of the hamburgers, assembly of the cooked burgers with the side dish and required drink and back to the drive-thru counter. Allon and Federgruen (2006) have shown that the cost structure in (5) applies to a general Jackson network, assuming the variable capacity costs are proportional with the service rates installed at the various nodes of the network. Thirdly, the service process may be best described as a GI/GI/s system, with an arbitrary renewal arrival process, arbitrary service time distribution and a team of s parallel servers. If the consumer is particularly focused on the delay experienced in the drive-thru queue and if W denotes a given fractile of the delay distribution, then the cost structure in (5) arises as a close approximation, see Allon and Federgruen (2006) . This approximation is based on so-called Cramer-Lundberg exponential approximations for the tail probability of steady-state delays. The exponential approximation states the existence of constants a, α > 0 such that P r[D > x] ≈ ae −αx , i.e.
lim x→∞ e αx P r[D > x] = 0. This identity is, in fact, exact, rather then an asymptotically correct approximation when the service time distribution is exponential, i.e in the case of a GI/M/s system.
We refer to Allon and Federgruen (2006) for additional queueing models resulting in affine cost structures of type (5). Allon and Federgruen (2006) also show that an even larger set of queueing models give rise to cost functions of the type
. . , K} and mean zero noise terms {u
j }. Our estimation method can be adapted to this more general cost structure.
The Price Competition Model
We are now ready to analyze the price competition model which arises when all waiting time standards have been specified. We assume, that every outlet is independently owned. However, our methodology is readily adapted if various outlets are jointly managed by the same franchisee, see below. In view of (5)
denotes firms j's profit level as a function of all prices charged by the various outlets. The following theorem, in Allon et al. (2009) , confirms a long standing conjecture that a price competition model with multinomial logit demand function and random coefficients, and an affine cost structure 7 has a unique interior 7 For example, in their classical paper Berry et al. (1995) note: "We assume that a Nash equilibrium to this pricing game exists, and that the equilibrium prices are in the interior of the firms' strategy sets (the positive orthant). While Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) provide a set of conditions for the existence of an equilibrium for related models of single product firms, their theorems do not easily generalize to the multi product case. However, we are able to check numerically whether our final estimates are consistent with the existence of an equilibrium. Note that none of the properties of the estimates require uniqueness of equilibrium, although without uniqueness it is not clear how to use our estimates to examine the effects of policy and environmental changes." point equilibrium. Thomadsen (2005b) , recently, identified some sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium but concludes his paper, stating "While the theorem provides a limited set of conditions under which there exists a pure strategy equilibrium . . . , and while existence is shown for any distribution of consumers and firms, what is lacking are proofs of uniqueness". In our model, the equilibrium is the unique solution of the system of equations (7), below.
Theorem 3.1 Assuming no outlet captures more than half of the potential consumer market, in any tract or demographic group, the price competition model has a unique equilibrium in the interior of the price
The equilibrium is the unique solution of the system of equations:
It is easily verified that
In matrix notation, the equilibrium conditions (7) can be stated as:
where Ω is a diagonal J × J matrix whose the j-th diagonal element Ω j,j = ∂Q j ∂P j 8 . For any choice of the parameters θ = (β , γ , δ , π , α ) the corresponding vector of cost rate residuals can thus be determined in closed form:
Data
We have studied the fast-food industry in Cook County, Illinois. We have chosen this industry both because of the availability of data and because this is an industry that has historically placed a premium on competing via its service levels. The QSR Magazine 2007 Drive-Thru Time Study notes that in 2007 all quick-service chains made major efforts to improve speed-of-service in their drive-thrus, see Nuckolls (2007) . Examples of new technology improving speed-of-service include timer systems that allow in-store managers as well as regional and national offices to monitor waiting times at outlets, as well as the outsourcing of drive-thru order taking. There is a plethora of anecdotal evidence that the industry is reacting to consumer expectations.
The same 2007 QSR Drive-Thru study reported that 70% of surveyed customers said speed is an important factor in the drive-thru experience. The 2008 study reports that this trend is continuing, with the fastest chain, Wendy's, shaving off an additional 7 seconds from the average waiting time in the previous year.
We use as our data set, all fast-food outlets belonging to chains selling hamburgers and with a presence of more than 5 outletsin Cook County Illinois. We consider only outlets with drive-thru windows because outlets without drive-thru windows tend to be located in places such as malls and airports where consumers are facing a different set of considerations. This results in a total of 388 outlets belonging to McDonald's (173), Burger King (92), Wendy's (62), White Castle (42), Dairy Queen (10), and Steak 'n Shake (9).
For each outlet we gathered prices for the franchise's signature burger, a small fries order, and a small soft-drink by calling the location in 2006. The type of burger selected was standardized by weight and in the case of White Castle, which sells small burgers, we use the price for four sliders. These prices have been aggregated to compute the price of a complete standard meal at that outlet. We tried to call the chains themselves for price information or for any pricing guidelines that they may give to their franchisees.
We were told that even the practice of suggesting prices to the outlets is illegal (see the discussion at the beginning of §3). Thus, waiting times are selected centrally by the chains but prices are chosen by the individual outlets. Indeed, we have noticed very significant price differences among outlets belonging to the same chain, with the most expensive McDonald's or Burger King outlet being about 50% more expensive than the cheapest outlet in the county, see Table 3 . As mentioned, in the absence of data on joint ownership among franchises, we assume each outlet is owned independently, or, at least, operating as an independent profit center 9 .
As discussed, all chains select and strive for a common waiting time standard among all of their outlets. In addition, customers often frequent more than a single outlet of a chain and expect to experience a similar service level, irrespective of the specific chain outlet they go to. We have selected the average steadystate waiting time, defined as the time spent in the drive-thru queue plus the service time, as the waiting time standard used in the consumer choice model of subsection 3. corresponds with a few city blocks. The next smallest geographic area recognized by the U.S. Census, the so-called block groups, are so small that some demographic data, such as race, cannot be reported without revealing the exact household being discussed and hence are not available to the public. We have considered the following age brackets: 0-9, 10-19, 20-39, 40-59, and 60+. We considered black and white consumers only because these are the racial groups for which we had the necessary data for employing the macro moments discussed in Section 6. As mentioned in Section 3, consumers are also differentiated based on whether they are at work or home. As far as the residents in a tract are concerned, we collected the number of people of each age bracket, race, and gender combination from the 2000 U.S. Census data. As to the population working in each of the tracts, The Bureau of Transportation Statistics reports the number of people commuting between every tract pair broken down by age group, race, and gender. We aggregated the flow of workers into each tract in Cook County from any originating tract (whether or not the originating tract was within Cook County). Unlike the US census data, the Bureau of Transportation Statistics data are not broken down by age, gender and race combination, so, we estimated the population numbers of each combination by assuming the three social attributes are independent. If a person lives and works in Cook County they are counted as two consumers. We do this because such consumers have the potential to consume one meal, i.e. lunch, while at work, and another meal, i.e. dinner, while at home. Distinguishing between commuters and residents, two genders and two racial groups, as well as among 5 age brackets, we have thus divided the population into 40 different socio-economic groups. The distance from the consumer to each outlet is calculated as the distance from the tract centroid in which the consumer is located. To compute the distances between the various tract centroids and the restaurant locations, we have employed the ArcView Geographic Information System modeling and mapping software.
In addition to the independent variables, we collected data for the so-called instruments used in the estimation method. These are outlet specific variables that are correlated with one or more of the independent variables but not with the noise terms { j : j = 1, ..., J} in the cost rates. Following the recommendation in Thomadsen (2005a) , we have selected the following instrumental variables: V 1j = the distance from outlet j to the nearest outlet, V 2j = the number of outlets within two miles of outlet j, V 3j = the population density in the tract to which outlet j belongs, and V 4j = the worker density in this tract. Table 3 shows summary statistics for these as well as the price variables. 
Estimation
As mentioned in the introduction, the major hurdle to our estimation of the parameters of the demand functions, and the firms' cost structure, is the lack of available demand data. As explained, this challenge is not unique to the fast food industry, but presents itself in almost all service industries. The unavailability of sales data prevents the use of standard regression-type estimation techniques. Instead, we employ a technique that estimates the parameters on the basis of the equilibrium conditions, specified in subsection 3.3, which characterize the unique Nash equilibrium in the second-stage price competition among the outlets, see Theorem 3.1. In the context of industrial organization studies, this so-called Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) technique for circumventing a lack of demand data, was first introduced by Berry et al. (1995) . See Nevo (2000) and Hall (2005) for clear expositions.
The equilibrium conditions (10) represent a system of equations which involve only the observed price vector P , waiting time standards W , outlet attribute matrix X, and distances {D j,b j = 1, . . . , J, b = 1, . . . , B}, as well as the unknown parameter string. (In particular, the system of equations does not involve the unobservable sales volumes.) Standard maximum likelihood estimation techniques require a choice of the specific unconditional distributions for the noise terms . Moreover, because of the endogeneity of the price vector P , these variables are correlated with the cost rate noise terms { j : j = 1, . . . , J}, so that all conditional distributions [ j |P l : 1 ≤ j, l ≤ J] need to be pre-specified as well. Incorrect guesses for these various distributions, may result in biased inferences, see Hall (2005) .
The GMM technique overcomes both difficulties. It employs a vector of so-called instrument variables
. . , Z rj } which are correlated with (some of) the explanatory variables {P, X, W, D}, but uncorrelated with the cost rate noise terms , i.e.
E[Z lj j ] = 0 for all cost rates l = 1, . . . , r and all outlets j = 1, . . . , J
Our instruments are based on the four instrumental variables V 1 j,V 2 j,V 3 j,V 4 j defined in Section 4. In order to account for asymmetries in the way that different chains are affected by these instrumental variables,
we interact these variables with the chain indicator vectors, i.e. the columns of the matrix X, to arrive at a total of 24 instruments: for all j = 1, . . . , J, Z j ≡ {Z l,k,j = V lj · X kj , l = 1, . . . , 4, k = 1, . . . , K}. Intuitively, these instruments affect demand by altering the strength of competition and the size of the potential market.
Moreover, they appear to be uncorrelated with the cost rate differential outlet j is experiencing vis-a-vis the chain norm. In other words, it is reasonable to assume that the moment conditions (11) apply. In view of the population moment conditions (11) we must have that for the proper parameter vector θ, the sample
, of the vector of random variables {Z t j j , j = 1, . . . , J} is as close to zero as possible. The GMM estimator determines a parameter vectorθ which minimizes a quadratic function of this sample average; more specifically, for a given weighting matrix Â
The optimal weighting matrix for the GMM estimator has been shown to be the inverse of the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of the moment conditions. However, as this matrix is not available, a-priori, we follow the commonly used two-step estimation procedure: In the first step, we use the GMM with weighting matrix A 1 = I to get a consistent initial estimatorθ 1 . We use θ 1 to estimate the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of the moment conditions,
, and solve the optimization problem (12) with A 2 10 .
There are well documented technical difficulties associated with the optimization problem (12). Its objective function has many local optima quite far from the globally optimal solution. In addition, there are large regions where this function is close to flat, creating formidable difficulties for standard gradient methods.
To mitigate these difficulties, we restrict the feasible region for the parameter vector θ by imposing several reasonable constraints. For all chains k = 1,...,K, let
= the fraction of the population in tract b and socio-economic group m which purchases a fast food meal; con(con) = an upper (lower) bound for the fraction of the population in any geographical area and any socio-economic group to purchase a fast food meal;
J k = {j : k(j) = k} denotes the set of outlets belonging to chain k c k (θ) = best estimate of chain k's standard cost rate c k = 1
We impose the constraints:
Thus, instead of the unconstrained problem (12), we solve the constrained optimization problem:
(P ) min θ {(12) s.t. (15) and (16)} . To solve the constrained optimization problem, we propose replacing the soft constraints (15) and (16) by penalty functions added to the objective function with Λ, a multiplier applied to the penalty functions, we thus obtain:
We have developed a special algorithm to solve (P) via the modified objective (15). The algorithm begins with a large value for Λ, the weight of the penalty functions, relative to the objective function value at the starting point and involves a quasi-Newton search method. This initial value for Λ is set so that the penalty term is roughly, two orders of magnitude larger than the quadratic term in the objective. During this search, we restrict movement in the direction of the barriers imposed by the penalty functions so that any point within the interior of the feasible region can be reached, but points along the barrier are not approached very quickly, thus preventing the algorithm from 'trapping' itself in unfavorable points. When a stopping condition is reached, the penalty weight Λ is halved and the quasi-Newton search re-run. In the first iteration, when the penalty Λ is large, this results in the algorithm moving to a point which is quite far from the barriers. The algorithm iterates until the penalty weight is small enough to render the penalty terms is insignificant compared to the regular objective function (12).
To arrive at the reported estimates, we used a process in which, in the first stage, we took 19 starting points and ran both the above algorithm as well as the general KNITRO algorithm with default optionsresulting in 38 estimates. We then took the (almost) 20 best local optima found, for the objective function (13), generated weighting matrices for each of these points and, in the second stage, ran our algorithm as well as the KNITRO algorithm from each of these 20 points, generating 40 final estimates.
While there are asymptotically accurate approximations for the variances of the parameter estimates, see e.g. Hall (2005) , these are often known to be bad (See Brown and Newey (2002) and the 1996 special issue of the Journal of Business and Economic Statistics quoted therein). Therefore, in order to validate the statistical significance of these estimates, we constructed confidence intervals using a bootstrapping procedure. This procedure is advocated when there is no sample data available beyond those used to obtain the estimate, see e.g. Brown and Newey (2002) . The idea is to use subsets of the sample and calculate the value of the estimator on each subset in order to estimate the variance. To that end, we selected 20 random subsets of the tracts, and ran the algorithm on each subset for each of the 20 (second stage) starting points of the two algorithms, resulting in a total of 800 parameter values. Each subset has 134 tracts (10% of total number of tracts). We estimated the coefficients for each sub-model and used the empirical distribution to construct the confidence intervals for each parameter.
As additional robustness tests for our estimates and also to attempt to improve the efficiency of our estimates, we supplemented the twenty-four micro-moments, introduced in §5, with additional so-called macromoments. Imbens and Lancaster (1994) suggest supplementing micro-moments with macro-moments to increase the efficiency of the estimates. This approach has been used in industrial organization studies by Petrin (2002) and Davis (2006) . See Appendix 1 for a specification of the macro-moments.
Results
In this section, we report the results of the estimation process. We focus on the key parameters of interest, emphasizing those that are statically significant. The β-parameters in the utility measure in equation (1) denote the shift in utility an outlet experiences when belonging to a specific chain. Our estimates show, for example, that the shift parameter is positive when the outlet belongs to the McDonald's and Burger King chains, and negative when it is a franchise of Dairy Queen. However, the estimates fail to be statistically significant, which is why these values are ommitted.
We first note that with the exception of the sensitivity to distance, the estimates and confidence intervals obtained with and without marcro-moments are close to each other, thus showing that our results are robust 13 . The results in Table 4 show that both the price sensitivity and waiting time sensitivity parameters γ 12 The estimates with macro-moments are based on a single stage of estimation. We were unable to perform the second estimation stage since the moment variance-covariance matrices at most candidate optima were close to singular. 13 Due to the fact that, when estimating with macro-moments, we could not perform the second stage of the estimation procedure, the associated confidence intervals are slightly wider than when estimating without the macro-moments. and α are significantly positive, at the 90% confidence level. (The two are, in fact, significant at the 99% confidence level). We thus conclude that both the price and waiting time parameters have a significant impact on the consumer's decision at which outlet to purchase a fast-food meal, if at all. These results confirm our initial conjecture, as well as the belief expressed by industry experts, that in the fast-food drive-thru industry customers trade off price and waiting time. In addition, our estimates in Table 4 indicate that consumers attribute a very high cost to the time they spend waiting. In particular, to overcome an additional second of waiting time, an outlet will need to compensate an average customer by as much as $0.06 (= 0.0259/0.4364) in a meal whose typical price ranges from $2.25 to $6. This corresponds to an hourly cost rate of more than ten times the (pre-tax) average wage of $18/hour. Even when considering the 90% confidence intervals for the estimates, comparing (opposite) extreme values of these confidence intervals, the average consumer assigns a cost to waiting which corresponds with an hourly rate of at least $40. Since price differences in this industry, as in many others , are rather modest, this valuation implies that in the drive-thru market waiting time plays a more significant role than pricing in explaining sales volumes. Moreover, these results seem to justify the continuing trend of chains making substantial to improve their waiting time.
We observe that the sensitivity to the distance measure is consistently smaller. The contrast with the waiting time sensitivity is, at first, striking. After all, the consumer's need to traverse a given distance translates into an amount of time expended in traveling as well as the waiting process in the drive-thru queue. The fact that this loss of time is valued so differently from the time spent waiting in the drivethru queue itself is consistent with findings in the behavioral economics literature, see e.g. Kahneman and Tversky (1984) and Larson (1987) which reveal that individuals value time very differently, depending on the context and the degree to which the time is spent is pleasurable or not: most people mind time spent driving far less than time waiting idly; many even enjoy the ride. In addition, the distance between the consumers' residence and the outlet is not the best possible measure for the additional effort and time she needs to expend to travel to the outlet. After all, many consumers stop in a drive-thru on the way from one point to the other, so that the disutility associated with travel time is not perfectly measured by the distance between the consumer's residence or work place and the outlet. This observation also helps to explain why, in contrast to the other parameters, the estimates for the distance sensitivity parameter fail to be robust and why they are associated with relatively large confidence intervals. A last explanation for the fact that the estimated distance sensitivity parameter is low relative to the waiting time sensitivity is the fact that our study was carried out in Cook County, which is mostly (sub)urban and dense in fast food outlets.
The estimates and confidence intervals for the variable cost rates are again uniformaly robust. They It is of interest to compare our results with those of Thomadsen (2005a) who employed a similar model to estimate market share equations in the fast-food industry in Santa Clara, California. Thomadsen's consumer choice model disregards differences in service attributes as explanatory variables. His estimate for the price sensitivity parameter is approximately double the value we obtain. Indeed, when service level attributes such as waiting time are disregarded, any reasonable estimation method can be expected to attribute a greater weight to price differentials to explain differences in sales volumes and market shares. Moreover, Thomadsen (2005a) and Burger King cover the vast majority of the market, the mere presence of many competing chains and outlets reduces equilibrium prices for a given level of price sensitivities appreciably. Conversely, for fixed observed price levels, disregarding the presence of certain sets of competitors results in inflated estimates for the price sensitivity. Beyond considering all national chains with 5 or more outlets in the county, we represent the fast-food market as more competitive than Thomadsen does, in that we disregard the fact that a certain percentage of franchise owners own multiple outlets. (As mentioned, we lacked information about common ownership.) Ignoring the limited co-ownership phenomenon, see Footnote 9, results in under estimated equilibrium price sensitivity estimates, for given observed price levels. Note, that even if the price sensitivity parameters were double our estimate, the estimated cost of waiting time would be in excess of $100/hr. Finally, Thomadsen's 90% confidence interval on the price estimate has a margin of error more than 5 times ours. Indeed, our confidence intervals are entirely contained in his.
Counter Factuals
How much, then, is it worth to reduce the waiting time standards? We mentioned the industry maxim that a 7 second reduction in waiting times increase a chain's market share by 1%. We investigated the impact of a single chain reducing its waiting time standard by 7 seconds, allowing all outlets to adjust their prices to the new price equilibrium. The results of this experiment can be seen in Table 5 . In the first two rows, we
give the estimated daily demand and market share of each chain at the current waiting time standards and prices. The subsequent rows show the resulting changes in the chains' market share and demand volume.
The percentage of the total market captured at the current waiting time standards closely matches the results in Paeratakul et al. (2003) , providing further validation of our estimates.
Our results confirm that the industry maxim is, on "average", correct. However, the absolute change in market share ranges from 3% at McDonald's (the market leader) to 0.04% at Dairy Queen, with Wendy's, In conclusion, reducing waiting time standards pays off handsomely in the fast food industry. Consumers assign an implicit value to waiting in the drive-thru queue which amounts to at least $40/hr, more than twice the pre-tax U.S. wage. A 7 second reduction, the magnitude of Wendy's improvement from 2007 to 2008, implies an "average" increase of a chain's market share by approximately one percentage point but for a large chain like McDonald's, it would result in an increase by more than 3% and an increase in its sales volume by 15%. The competitive dynamics are such that, to the extent feasible via incremental process and technological improvements, it is in all chains' interests to reduce their waiting times; this occurs to a large extent because such service improvements result in more potential consumers selecting the fast food option.
Conclusions and Extensions
In this paper, we have proposed an approach to estimate how sales volumes for a service organization depend on all prices and waiting times of the various service providers in the relevant region, along with other relevant attributes. We have applied this approach to the drive-thru fast food industry in Cook County, IL. Here, customers attribute an implicit value to their waiting time which is a multiple of the average pretax wage rate in the US. Most importantly, chains can improve their absolute and relative market shares very significantly by relatively modest reductions in waiting time, which explains why all chains make continuous efforts to shave off seconds from their consumer waiting time.
Several important extensions of our study and underlying model would be valuable. First, it is not clear whether the waiting time experience is best characterized by the average alone, or (, additionally,) by other measures such as the standard deviation and/or a percentile (say the 90-th percentile) of the waiting time distribution. Even if the average waiting time is the best proxy, it is conceivable that the consumer's utility level diminishes in a non-linear way with it. A similar non-linear dependence on the distance variable may be explored as well. In addition, other service attributes such as the accuracy of the order filling process and the clarity of the speaker and menu board could be included as explanatory variables in the random utility model (1), rather than being aggregated into the chain indicator variable as is done in this paper. 
. . . 
where R 0−9 denotes the national fraction of fast-food consumers who belong to the 0-9 age bracket as estimated by the Paeratakul et al. (2003) study, P op 0−9 denotes the Cook County population in this age bracket, and Q j,0−9 (θ) denotes the demand of consumers age 0-9 at outlet j. Similar definitions pertain to the other R , P op , and Q numbers. As suggested in Thomadsen (2005a) The macro-moments are constructed based on the idea that the consumption ratio of related demographic groups in Cook County should be close to the national consumption ratios. For example, the local ratio of men to women consuming a fast food meal should match the national ratio.
